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Abstract
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the
values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an
algorithm that finds the optimal randomized mechanism that runs in time polynomial in the size
of the support. We leverage this result to show that in the oracle model introduced by Ronen and
Saberi [FOCS’02], there exists a polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanism that provides a
(3
2
+ ǫ)-approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism,
and a polynomial time deterministic truthful mechanism that guarantees 5
3
approximation to the
revenue achievable by an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism.
We show that the 5
3
-approximation mechanism provides the same approximation ratio also with
respect to the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism. This shows that the performance gap
between truthful-in-expectation and deterministic mechanisms is relatively small. En route, we solve
an open question of Mehta and Vazirani [EC’04].
Finally, we extend some of our results to the multi-item case, and show how to compute the
optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for bidders with more complex valuations.
1 Introduction
Myerson, in his seminal paper [9], studies the following problem: n bidders are competing on a single
item. Each bidder’s value for the item is drawn independently from a distribution. What is the optimal
revenue-maximizing auction? Myerson gives a complete and simple characterization of the optimal
auctions. A natural open question raised by this work is to analyze the case when the bidders’ values
are drawn from a general (correlated) distribution. That question is the topic of this paper.
Naturally, the problem has been heavily studied in economics. Usually, the economics approach
involved attempts to characterize restricted special cases. See [5] for a survey. One notable exception
was given by Cremer and McLean [4], who show that sometimes an auction that extracts the full social
welfare exists. However, the proposed solution works only for a restricted class of distributions. More
severely, although each bidder’s expected gain from participating in the mechanism is zero, it is common
for a bidder to be charged an amount greatly exceeding her value. Hence the bidders have little incentive
to participate in the auction in the first place.
Ronen [12] offers a thought-provoking alternative to the economics approach: instead of struggling
to find an exact characterization of optimal auctions – even though a simple characterization probably
does not exist in the case of correlated distributions – we should design auctions that are approximately
optimal. Ronen presents the following elegant truthful mechanism, the lookahead auction, that provides
in expectation at least half of the revenue of the optimal auction. First, find the n− 1 bidders with the
lowest values. Given their values, consider the conditional distribution of the value vi of bidder i with
the highest valuation, and calculate a price p that maximizes the expected revenue. If vi ≥ p, bidder i
is assigned the item and is charged p, otherwise no one is assigned the item and no one pays anything.
We continue the line of research of studying approximately optimal auctions. In particular, we
investigate the following three research directions.
Research Direction I: Obtaining Better Approximation Ratios
Perhaps the first question every theoretical computer scientist would ask following Ronen’s paper is:
“Are there mechanisms with better approximation ratios?” To answer this question we have to be more
explicit about the computational model in hand. Ronen and Saberi [13] introduce the oracle model :
the distribution is given to us as a black box and we are allowed to ask conditional-distribution queries.
That is, given the values of n − k players, what is the conditional distribution of the values of the
remaining k players? Ronen and Saberi prove several hardness results in this model, in particular that
no ascending auction can guarantee a 43 -approximation. The other model is the explicit model, where the
running time has to be polynomial in the support size of the distribution. Papadimitriou and Pierrakos
[11] prove that it is possible to exactly compute the optimal deterministic auction for 2 bidders, but
NP-hard to do so for more bidders.
Research Direction II: Relaxing the Solution Concept
This paper considers three extensively studied notions of truthfulness. The simplest and strongest
one is dominant strategy truthfulness (or deterministic truthfulness): a profit-maximizing strategy of
each bidder is to reveal his true value. The second notion is randomized universal truthfulness: here
a mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. The third notion is
that of truthfulness in expectation: revealing the true value maximizes the expected profit of each bidder,
where the expectation is taken over the internal random coins of the mechanism.
Myerson [9] shows that the optimal auction is always deterministic when bids are independent, even
if truthfulness in expectation is allowed1. We pose the following question: can truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms achieve more revenue than deterministic mechanisms when the distribution is correlated?
1In fact, he proves that this is true even under the weaker notion of Bayesian truthfulness (see [10] for a definition).
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If so, how much more? Notice that this question is of interest as a pure existence question, though it is
also interesting to consider the refinement in which the mechanisms are required to be computationally
efficient.
Research Direction III: Beyond Single-Item Auctions
Naturally, we would like to design revenue-maximizing auctions also for more complicated settings.
The direct characterization approach of economists was successful so far only in limited settings —
for example, Armstrong [1] characterizes optimal auctions for two items and two bidders with additive
valuations, where each bidder has only two possible values for each item and the valuations are inde-
pendently distributed — while the approximation approach of computer scientists was mostly successful
when considering the weak solution concept of Bayesian truthfulness [3, 2]2.
Our Results
Our paper contributes to all three research directions sketched above while drawing connections between
them. The starting point of our investigations is one, quite simple, observation: in the explicit model the
optimal truthful-in-expectation auction can be computed in polynomial time. As we explain in Section
3, this auction can be found by solving a natural linear program3 that encodes allocation probabilities,
expected payments, and the incentive constraints that link them. Unlike the mechanism of Cremer and
McLean [4], ours never charges agents an amount greater than their bid value, a property shared by all
of the mechanisms we construct in this paper.
Unfortunately, while the explicit model might be useful for settings with a small number of players,
for large numbers of players the distribution usually has exponentially large support, e.g. when each
player has two possible values and valuations are independent. We overcome this obstacle in Section 5
by reducing the optimal auction design problem for any number of players to the problem of designing
optimal auctions for a constant number of players, for which the LP-based approach is feasible. Consider
the following extension of the lookahead auction, termed the k-lookahead auction. Find the n−k bidders
with the lowest values. Given their values, consider the conditional distribution of the values of the k
bidders with the highest valuations, and run the optimal auction for these k bidders4. We show that
this auction is a 3k−12k−1 -approximation to the optimal revenue
5. In particular, this proves that there exists
a polynomial time (32 + ǫ)-approximation truthful-in-expectation mechanism in the oracle model.
In Section 4 we consider deterministic truthful mechanisms. We show the following general “de-
randomization” result: for every truthful-expectation mechanism for 2 bidders and a single item, there
exists a universally truthful mechanism with the same allocation function and the same payments. In
other words, relaxing the solution concept to truthfulness in expectation is useless, as every mechanism
(in the above setting) can be implemented using the stronger notion of universal truthfulness.
This result has several implications. The first one: for two players, the optimal deterministic mech-
anism has the same revenue as the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and can be found in
polynomial time. We achieve this by computing an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism A for
two bidders using the LP approach, and then “derandomizing” it into a universally truthful algorithm
A′ with the same expected revenue. Now, since all (deterministic) mechanisms in the support of A′
2Notice that in our setting we do not even assume the bidders are aware of the existence of an underlying distribution.
3Although some caution is needed as we have to define the mechanism for all possible values in the domain, not just
for values in the support of the distribution.
4This auction may be either deterministic or truthful-in-expectation, depending on the setting.
5Ronen [12] claims that the approximation ratio of the k-lookahead auction is no better than 2, for every k, but his
proof is incorrect. He essentially claims (without a proof) that all truthful mechanisms achieve an expected revenue of at
most 1 for a certain distribution for 2 bidders. However, the pivot auction we define in Section 5 provides an expected
revenue of 1.5 for that distribution.
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must have the same expected revenue with respect to the distribution (otherwise A′ is not optimal),
every one of them is an optimal revenue-maximizing deterministic mechanism.
Another implication is that the 2-lookahead auction is in fact deterministic, even if truthfulness-in-
expectation is allowed. We thus obtain the result that there exists a deterministic polynomial time
truthful mechanism in the oracle model that guarantees 35-fraction of the revenue of the optimal truthful-
in-expectation mechanism, and, as a corollary, that for every truthful-in-expectation mechanism with an
expected revenue of r, there exists a deterministic mechanism with expected revenue of at least 35r.
We stress that our derandomization result holds regardless of the objective function and even in
the prior free setting. We complement this result by showing that if each player has only two possible
values for the item (“low” and “high”) then the mechanism can be implemented as a universally truthful
mechanism, for any number of players. On the other hand, there is a 3-bidder 3-value truthful-in-
expectation mechanism that cannot be implemented as a universally truthful algorithm. Together, this
answers an open question of Mehta and Vazirani [8].
We show that our linear programming technique extends to yield computationally efficient, optimal
truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for a number of settings beyond single-item auctions. First, we
generalize to arbitrary single-parameter domains, showing that our linear program constitutes an effi-
cient reduction from revenue maximization to social welfare maximization, in the explicit model when
bidders have correlated types. The existence of such an efficient reduction in the case of independent
type distributions with polynomially bounded support size was known from the work of Myerson [9].
Next, we show that our technique also extends to certain multi-parameter domains: unit-demand val-
uations and additive valuations, again yielding computationally efficient optimal truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms in the explicit model. The key to these results lies in “decomposing” the fractional solution
as a convex combination of integer solutions. For the additive case we present a direct decomposition,
while for the-unit demand case we use the classical Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem. We complement
these positive results with a negative one: it is NP-hard to design optimal truthful-in-expectation mech-
anisms for bidders with OXS valuations, in contrast to the social welfare maximization problem which is
computationally easy for this class of valuations [6]. This section is postponed to the appendix (Section
A) due to lack of space.
Open Questions
While this paper studies several old questions, it also raises some new ones. Let us mention a few. In
the single-item auction setting, what is the best approximation ratio that can be obtained in polynomial
time by deterministic mechanisms? And by truthful-in-expectation mechanisms? We know the answer
only for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms in the explicit model, and have gaps in all other cases. The
key for a solution might be a better analysis of the k-lookahead auction. Our best lower bound on the
approximation ratio of the k-lookahead auction is k+1
k
. Does the approximation ratio of the k-lookahead
auction approach 1 as k grows? We suspect that it does not, but have been unable to prove it.
Another question is to understand how well deterministic mechanisms perform compared to their
truthful-in-expectation counterparts. We showed that the ratio is at most 53 . In Appendix D we present
an example demonstrating that the ratio is at least 1.001. Quantifying the gap essentially boils down
to the purely combinatorial problem of analyzing the integrality gap of our linear program.
We also provided conditions in which truthful-in-expectation mechanisms can be implemented as
universally truthful mechanisms. Can this be extended to other single-parameter settings, such as
scheduling on related machines?
The multi-item setting also has plenty of questions to offer. We showed that for additive and unit
demand valuations the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism can be efficiently computed in the
explicit model, but that it is hard to do so for the more general OXS class. Can we design truthful
mechanisms with a good approximation ratio for the OXS class, and for the richer gross substitutes class?
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The question is of interest also in the oracle model. Also, to what extent do truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms outperform deterministic mechanisms in these settings, ignoring computational issues?
Finally, it would be very interesting to study other ways of specifying the type distribution in both
the single and multi item settings. Specifically, in what cases can good approximations be obtained in
polynomial time, if we are only given black-box access to samples from the distribution?
Relation to the work of Papadimitriou and Pierrakos
An unpublished paper of Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [11] is highly related to ours. Their work es-
tablishes that optimal deterministic single-item auctions can be computed in polynomial time for two
bidders with correlated distributions, but the corresponding problem is NP-hard with three or more
bidders. One consequence of our approach of linear programming combined with derandomization is an
alternative proof of one of their results, namely the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm to compute
the optimal two-bidder deterministic auction. However, they are the first discoverers of this result; we
obtained our proof only after learning that they had such an algorithm.
Aside from this one result, the two papers are largely complementary. Their work focuses on de-
terministic mechanisms, small numbers of players, and computational complexity; ours emphasizes
randomized mechanisms, large numbers of players, and approximation.
2 Preliminaries
The Single-Item Setting
We have one item and n bidders, where bidder i has a privately known value vi ≥ 0. We assume some
distribution D on the values of bidders. We allow the distribution of different bidders’ values to be
correlated. A mechanism M takes a bid vector v and returns an allocation and a price for each bidder.
We use M(v) = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) to denote the allocation vector. In randomized mechanisms, we allow
allocations to be fractions. For example, M(v)i = xi is the probability with which bidder i gets the item
when the bid vector is v. Alternatively, we say bidder i gets a M(v)i fraction of the item. When the
mechanism is deterministic, each xi has to be 0 or 1. We require that
∑
i xi ≤ 1 in any allocation vector.
This condition is called the feasibility of M . In single-parameter domains, the feasibility condition is
generalized by stipulating that M(v) must lie in a specified set of feasible vectors or, in the case of
randomized mechanisms, the convex hull of the feasible vectors. When bidder i’s bid is vi and he gets
a fraction xi of the item, the expected payment he makes is required to be at most vixi. This is the
individual rationality (IR) condition. A mechanism is ex-post IR if, with any outcome of the random
coins, the payment made by the bidder who gets the item is at most his bid. Our goal is to maximize
the total expected payment (the revenue) of the bidders, where expectation is taken over D.
The valuations of all bidders but bidder i are denoted by v−i. Fix v−i. An auction (equivalently, a
mechanism) is called truthful if for every vi, v
′
i, we have xi · vi− pi ≥ x
′
i · vi− p
′
i. Here xi, pi (resp. x
′
i, p
′
i)
denote the allocation and expected payment when bidder i declares a value of vi (resp. v
′
i). Note that
when xi and x
′
i can be fractions, the two sides of the inequality are the expected profits of bidder i if he
bids vi and v
′
i, respectively. Therefore the mechanism can be called truthful in expectation: truthful for
bidders that maximize their expected utility. A mechanism is universally truthful if it is a probability
distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. Notice that the distribution D is not involved in
our definitions of truthfulness, i.e., our mechanisms are truthful for all possible values, not just values
in the support of D. In particular, observe that bidders do not need to have any knowledge of D, or
any other common prior.
For a distribution D and a mechanism M , let ED[M ] denote the revenue of M . A mechanism M is
called an α-approximation if ED [OPT ]
ED [M ]
≤ α, where OPT is the revenue-maximizing truthful mechanism
given D. (OPT might be truthful or truthful in expectation, depending on the setting.)
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To determine the running time of the mechanism, we use two different models. In the explicit
model we get an explicit list of every type in the support of D and its probability. The auction should
run in time polynomial in n and the description of D. In the oracle model, introduced by Ronen and
Saberi [13], the distribution is represented by an oracle that can answer the following type of queries6:
Pr[a1 = v1, . . . , an = vn], which may include conditional distribution queries. In this model the running
time should be polynomial in n and in the combined support size of the players’ marginal distributions
(i.e., the quantity Σi #{vi | ∃v−i such that (vi, v−i) ∈ support(D)}). We assume that the support of
each marginal distribution is known to the mechanism in advance.
Multi-Item Settings
In the last part of the paper we discuss multi-item issues. Here we have m items and n bidders, where
bidder i has a valuation function vi that gives a non-negative value for each bundle S of items. We
will consider several restrictions on the valuation functions, but we define them in the relevant sections.
The definitions from the single item case extend naturally: each bidder i is assigned a bundle Si (or a
distribution over bundles in the randomized case) and charged pi, where pi = 0 in case Si is the empty
bundle. We assume a distribution. As before, we want to maximize the expected revenue.
A mechanism is truthful if each bidder maximizes his profit by revealing his true valuation, and is
truthful-in-expectation if revealing his true valuation maximizes his expected profit. The definition of
approximation ratio extends naturally. In this paper, for multi-item settings we are interested only in
the explicit model, where the support of the distribution is explicitly enumerated. The running time of
mechanisms should be polynomial in m, n, and the size of the support.
3 An Optimal Truthful in Expectation Mechanism
In this section we show that the optimal truthful in expectation mechanism can be computed in time
polynomial in the size of the distribution D (the explicit model). We leverage this result later: in
Section 5 we analyze the approximation ratio of the k-lookahead auction. To make the k-lookahead
auction efficient, the construction of this section is involved as a subroutine. As a consequence of
Section 4 we have that the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism for two bidders is deterministic.
Finally, in Appendix A we extend this construction to several more complicated domains.
The result of this section is based on writing a natural linear program for the problem. We have to
be a bit careful when interpreting the linear program as a truthful mechanism, as the mechanism has
to be defined over all possible bid vectors, not just those in the support of D. Towards this end, we
will need some notation and definitions. Let Di = {vi | ~v ∈ D}. We assume that for every i, 0 ∈ Di.
This is without loss of generality since we may assume that PrD[(0, ~v−i)] = 0. Let T = {(di, v−i) | di ∈
Di and v−i ∈ D−i}. Observe that |T | ≤ n · |D|
2.
• Solve the following linear program:
Maximize:
∑
~v∈D PrD[~v]
∑
i pi,~v
Subject to:
– For each ~v ∈ T :
∑
i,~v xi,~v ≤ 1.
– For each bidder i, ~v ∈ T , v′i ∈ Di: xi,~v · vi − pi,~v ≥ xi,(v′i,~v−i) · vi − pi,(v′i,~v−i).
– For each i, ~v ∈ T : xi,~v ≥ 0, pi,~v ≥ 0.
– For each i, ~v−i ∈ T : pi,(0,~v−i) = 0.
6The oracle used in this paper is strictly weaker than the oracle of [13]. Since our interest in the oracle model lies in
designing efficient algorithms, this only strengthen our result.
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• Let ~v = v1, . . . , vn be the (realized) valuations of the bidders. The allocation and payments are
determined according to the following cases:
1. If ~v ∈ D, then allocate the item to exactly one bidder, where each bidder i receives the item
with probability xi,~v. Let the payment of the winning bidder i be
pi,~v
xi,~v
. The other bidders
pay 0.
2. If ~v /∈ D, every bidder i for which v−i /∈ D−i is not allocated the item and does not pay
anything. For each bidder i for which ~v−i ∈ D−i, let v
′
i = argmaxv′i∈Di xi,(v′i,v−i) ·vi−pi,(v′i,v−i).
Each such bidder i receives the item with probability xi,(v′i,v−i) and pays
pi,(v′
i
,v−i)
xi,(v′
i
,v−i)
contingent
upon receiving the item.
Theorem 3.1 The mechanism is feasible, individually rational, truthful in expectation, and runs in
time polynomial in the size of the distribution D. Its expected revenue is equal to the expected revenue
of the optimal (individually rational) truthful in expectation mechanism for D.
The proof is in Appendix B.
4 Randomized vs. Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms
In this section, we show that for every two-bidder truthful-in-expectation mechanism M , there exists
a universally truthful mechanism M ′ with “the same” behavior. In other words, for two-bidder single
item auctions, relaxing the solution concept from universal truthfulness to truthfulness in expectation
is useless: every allocation function that is implementable by a truthful-in-expectation mechanism is
also implementable by a universally truthful mechanism.
Definition 4.1 A mechanism M ′ implements another mechanism M if, for every bid vector and every
bidder i, M ′ allocates the item to i with the same probability and at the same expected price as M .
Notice that if M ′ implements M , then the two mechanisms have the same expected revenue. We
show that for two bidders, for every truthful-in-expectation mechanismM , there is a universally truthful
mechanism that implements it. We would also like to show that this can be done efficiently. We assume
that M is represented by an oracle:
Definition 4.2 Let R1u be {(x, p) | ∃v such that M(v, u)1 = (x, p)}, and R
2
v be {(x, p) | ∃u such that M(v, u)2 =
(x, p)}. An alternative oracle gets as input the value v of bidder i and returns R3−iv .
Theorem 4.3 If M is a truthful-in-expectation ex-post IR mechanism for two bidders, then there exists
a universally truthful ex-post IR mechanism M ′ that implements M . Moreover, if M is represented by
an alternative oracle then M ′ can be found in time that is polynomial in maxi,v |R
i
v|.
The proof is constructive and presents an algorithm that takes a truthful-in-expectation mechanism
M as input and outputs a universally truthful mechanism M ′ that implements M . The algorithm is
efficient as long as the alternative oracle can be efficiently implemented. In particular we get that:
Corollary 4.4 There is an algorithm that finds a 2-bidder optimal revenue-maximizing deterministic
truthful mechanism in time polynomial to the size of the support of the distribution.
Proof: In the previous section we showed that an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism M
can be found in time polynomial in the size of the support of the distribution. Since alternative oracle
queries can be answered in time polynomial in the size of the support of the mechanism, Theorem 4.3
6
guarantees that we can find a universally truthful mechanism M ′ that implements M in polynomial
time. Finally, M ′ is a distribution over deterministic mechanisms that achieves an optimal revenue (in
expectation). Thus, every mechanism in the support of M obtains that revenue, in particular the one
that sets all the random coins to, say, 0.
This amounts to a re-derivation of a result in [11]. (The statement of their result was made public
before we started working on this paper.) However, we would like to stress that the applicability of our
result is not limited to revenue maximization. For example, Vincent and Manelli show the following:
Theorem 4.5 (Vincent and Manelli [7]) LetM be a Bayesian truthful mechanism with independent
distributions. Then, there is a truthful-in-expectation mechanism that implements7 M .
Therefore, by [7] and Theorem 4.3, we have that:
Theorem 4.6 Let M be a two-bidder Bayesian truthful mechanism with independent distributions.
Then there is a universally truthful mechanism that implements M .
Furthermore, we show the following result that together with the algorithm answers an open question
of Mehta and Vazirani [8]. (For the proof see Appendix C.2 Theorem C.5 and Appendix D Lemma D.1.)
Theorem 4.7 Every truthful-in-expectation mechanism for n bidders where each bidder has only two
possible values can be implemented as a universally truthful mechanism. However, there exists a truthful-
in-expectation mechanism for three bidders where each bidder has three possible values that cannot be
implemented as a universally truthful mechanism.
Back to designing optimal auctions, we also show in Appendix D an explicit distribution with
small support size, for which the best truthful-in-expectation mechanism performs better than the best
deterministic mechanism.
Proposition 4.8 There exists a distribution D for three bidders, with each bidder having only four
possible values in the support, for which the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism achieves strictly
more revenue than any deterministic mechanism.
4.1 The Algorithm
For the rest of the discussion in this subsection we fix a truthful in expectation mechanism M . In
this presentation of the algorithm we assume Riv contains finitely many elements. We extend it in
Appendix C.1 to a procedure for constructing a universally truthful mechanism that implements M,
even when the sets Riv are infinite.
Observe that by truthfulness, if (xi, pi) ∈ Riv−i , then (x
i, pˆi) /∈ Riv−i , for every p 6= pˆ. Hence we
define a total order on the elements of Riv−i : (x
i, pi) > (xˆi, pˆi) if and only if xi > xˆi. We can therefore
sort the elements in Rv−i in the increasing order, so that (x
i
1, p
i
1) < (x
i
2, p
i
2) < . . . < (x
i
ℓ, p
i
ℓ). If x
i
ℓ < 1,
then we add (xiℓ+1,∞) to R
i
v−i
. If (0, 0) is not in Riv−i , then add (x
i
0 = 0, p
i
0 = 0) to R
i
v−i
. Note that
by individual rationality, pi0 must be 0.
The main idea of the algorithm is to set a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each bidder where the price
of the offer is obtained by randomly “simulating” Myerson’s payment formula [9]. The novelty of the
proof is in showing that these offers can be coordinated in the following sense: when one bidder accepts
the offer the other one will reject it. We present the algorithm as follows. The proof of its correctness
is given in Appendix C.1. The running time of the algorithm is obviously polynomial in maxi,v |R
i
v|.
7A truthful-in-expectation mechanism M ′ implements a Bayesian truthful mechanism M (when the distribution is D)
if, for every each bidder i and vi ∈ Di, the probability with which bidder i gets the item when he bids vi in M is exactly
the same as that in M ′, i.e.,
∑
v
−i:(vi,v−i)∈D
M ′(vi, v−i)i.
7
1. Sample r ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random.
2. Elicit a bid from each bidder. Let the bids be (v1, v2).
3. For each bidder i, i ∈ {1, 2}:
(a) Consider Riv−i = {(x
i
k, p
i
k) | x
i
k < x
i
k+1,∀k}. Label points in each interval (x
i
k, x
i
k+1] ⊆ [0, 1]
with
pik+1−p
i
k
xi
k+1−x
i
k
.
(b) If i = 1, let p be the label of the point r. If i = 2, let p be the label of the point 1− r.
(c) If i = 1, allocate the item to bidder i only if r ≤ M(v1, v2)i. If i = 2, allocate the item to
bidder i only if 1− r < M(v1, v2)i. If the bidder is allocated the item then his payment is p.
5 The Approximation Ratio of the k-Lookahead Auction
In this section we analyze the k-lookahead auction which is defined as follows. Find the k bidders with
the highest values, and denote this set of bidders by K. Run the revenue-maximizing truthful auction
for K conditioned on the values of bidders in N \K. Notice that the auction for K can either be the
optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism or the optimal deterministic mechanism.
Theorem 5.1 The approximation ratio of the k-lookahead auction is at least 3k−12k−1 . In particular, for
k = 2 the approximation ratio is at least 53 , and the approximation ratio tends to
3
2 as k tends to ∞.
We remark that if the auction for K is allowed to be truthful-in-expectation, then the approximation
ratio is with respect to the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism8. Taking into account the result
of Section 3 we get that:
Corollary 5.2 The k-lookahead auction provides a 3k−12k−1-approximation to the revenue of the optimal
truthful-in-expectation mechanism. The auction runs in polynomial time in the oracle model.
Our derandomization result for 2-bidder auctions (Section 4) gives us that:
Corollary 5.3 The 2-lookahead auction provides a 53 -approximation to the revenue of the optimal
truthful-in-expectation mechanism. The 2-lookahead auction is deterministic in this case and runs in
polynomial time in the oracle model.
In particular this implies that we can bound the ratio between the revenue achieved by the optimal
truthful-in-expectation mechanism and the optimal deterministic mechanism for n-bidder single-item
auctions in general:
Corollary 5.4 Let r be the revenue of the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism for a single item
with distribution D. There is a deterministic mechanism for a single item and distribution D with
revenue at least 3r5 .
8Similarly, if the auction for K is allowed to be Bayesian truthful, then the approximation ratio is with respect to the
optimal Bayesian truthful mechanism.
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5.1 Analysis of the k-Lookahead Auction
Denote the original distribution by D, and denote the conditional distribution of the values of the
bidders in K given the values of bidders in N \ K by DK . We let vk+1 denote the the value of the
(k + 1)th-highest bidder. We show that one of the following three families of auctions provides a good
approximation ratio. The k-lookahead auction obviously provides at least as much expected revenue,
and the theorem follows. The auctions are defined for k ≥ 2. The second and third auctions depend on
a parameter t ≥ 1, to be specified later.
1. k-Highest Auction: Run the optimal auction. If one of the bidders in N \ K is assigned the
item in the optimal auction, no bidder is assigned the item and no one is charged anything. If one
of the bidders in K is assigned the item in the revenue-maximizing auction then assign him the
item and charge him as in the revenue-maximizing auction.
2. t-Fixed Price Auction: Select one bidder (“the reserve bidder”) from K uniformly at random,
denote this bidder by i. If any of the bidders in K \ {i} has value above t · vk+1 then he receives
the item and pays t · vk+1. If there are several such bidders, break ties arbitrarily. Otherwise, the
reserve bidder gets the item and pays vk+1.
3. t-Pivot Auction: Select one bidder (“the pivot”) from K uniformly at random, and denote this
bidder by i. If any of the bidders of in K \ {i} has value above t · vk+1 then run the revenue
maximizing auction for bidders in K, conditioned on the values of bidders in N \K. Otherwise
the pivot bidder gets the item and pays vk+1.
It is straightforward to see that the k-Highest Auction and the t-Fixed Price Auction are truthful
and individually rational9. To see that the t-Pivot Auction is truthful we observe that this auction is
monotone: the only non-straightforward case to check is when bidder i raises his value and forces the
mechanism to run the optimal auction. However, in this case bidder i was not allocated the item before
raising his value, so monotonicity is preserved.
Proof: (of Theorem 5.1) Let l be the event where no bidder in K has value at least t · vk+1, and let l
be the complement of this event. We partition the expected revenue of the optimal auction:
• let Ll be the expected revenue from bidders in N \K from instances where event l occurs.
• let Ll be the expected revenue from bidders in N \K from instances where event l occurs.
• Let M be the expected revenue from bidders in K from instances where event l occurs.
• Let H be the expected revenue from bidders in K from instances where event l occurs.
Observe that the expected revenue of the optimal auction is Ll + Ll + H +M . We continue by
proving several lemmas.
Lemma 5.5 The expected revenue of the k-Highest Auction is M +H.
Proof: By definition the auction extracts exactly the same revenue as the optimal auction from
bidders in K and no revenue from bidders in N \K. The lemma follows.
Lemma 5.6 The expected revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction is at least Ll+
M
t
+ k−1
k
· t ·Ll +
1
k
·Ll.
9If the optimal auctions used by the k-Highest Auction and the t-Pivot Auction are deterministic or universally truthful,
then all three auctions are universally truthful, as is their convex combination. In this case our proof shows that there is a
deterministic auction on the k highest bidders that achieves a
(
3k−1
2k−1
)
-approximation to the deterministic optimal auction.
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Proof: First, notice that the revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction in every instance is at least vk+1
(either the reserve bidder is allocated the item and pays vk+1 or the auction sells the item at a higher
price). Suppose that event l occurs. This case contributes Ll+M to the expected revenue of the optimal
auction. Observe that, if l occurs, in any instance where the optimal auction sells the item to bidders in
N \K, its revenue is at most vk+1 (the price for a sold item is at most the value of the bidder), and that
in any instance the optimal auction sells the item to bidders in N \K the revenue is at most t · vk+1.
Thus, the instances where event l occurs contribute Ll+
M
t
to the expected revenue of the t-Fixed Price
Auction.
Suppose now that event l occurs. Thus, there exists some bidder b with vb > t·vk+1. With probability
exactly k−1
k
, b is not the reserve bidder and in this case the revenue of the auction is t · vk+1. With
probability 1
k
we have that b is the reserve bidder and the revenue of the auction is at least vk+1. In
particular, for every instance where the optimal auction sells the item to bidders in N \K (at a price of
at most vk+1) the t-Fixed Price Auction has an expected revenue of at least
k−1
k
· t ·Ll+
1
k
·Ll. Together
with the contribution from instances where event l occurs we have that the expected revenue of the
auction is at least Ll +
M
t
+ k−1
k
· t · Ll +
1
k
· Ll.
Lemma 5.7 The expected revenue of the t-Pivot Auction, conditioned on the values of bidders in K,
is at least Ll +
M
t
+ k−1
k
H + 1
k
Ll.
Proof: Suppose that event l occurs. The revenue of the t-Pivot Auction in every instance where l
occurs is vk+1. The expected revenue of the optimal auction in this case is Ll +M , and similarly to
the the analysis of the t-Fixed Price Auction the expected contribution to the revenue from instances
where event l occurs is Ll +
M
t
.
Suppose that event l occurs. Thus, there exists some bidder b with vb > t · vk+1. With probability
exactly k−1
k
, b is not the reserve bidder and in this case the revenue of the auction is at least H.
With probability 1
k
we have that b is the reserve bidder and the revenue of the auction is at least
1
k
· vk+1. Again, similarly to the analysis of the t-Fixed Price Auction the expected contribution to the
revenue when the event l occurs is k−1
k
H + 1
k
Ll. Overall, the expected revenue of the auction is at least
Ll +
M
t
+ k−1
k
H + 1
k
Ll.
Next we need some definitions. Conditioned on the values of bidders in N \ K, let OPT be the
revenue of the revenue-maximizing auction, Rh be the revenue of the k-Highest Auction, Rf be the
expected revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction, Rp the expected revenue of the t-Pivot Auction and
R = max(Rf , Rp). In addition, for the rest of the proof we fix t =
2k−1
k−1 .
Lemma 5.8 R ≥ Ll + Ll +
H+M
t
.
Proof: We divide the analysis into two cases. Suppose first that Ll · t ≥ H, which implies that
k−1
k
· (t− 1) · Ll = Ll ≥
H
t
by our choice of t. We have that:
Rf ≥ Ll +
M
t
+
k − 1
k
· t · Ll +
1
k
· Ll ≥ Ll +
M
t
+ Ll +
k − 1
k
· (t− 1) · Ll ≥ Ll + Ll +
H +M
t
Suppose now that Ll · t < H:
Rp ≥ Ll+
M
t
+
k − 1
k
·H+
1
k
·Ll ≥ Ll+
M
t
+
H
t
+
k2 − 2k + 1
k(2k − 1)
·H+
1
k
·Ll > Ll+
M
t
+
H
t
+
k − 1
k
·Ll+
1
k
·Ll
= Ll + Ll +
H +M
t
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We are now finally able to analyze the ratio between the expected ratio of the revenue-maximizing
auction and the k-lookahead auction. We consider two cases and show that in each one the expected
ratio is at most 2− 1
t
= 3k−12k−1 . In the first case we assume that Ll + Ll ≤ (H +M)(1−
1
t
). Therefore,
OPT
Rh
≤
Ll + Ll +H +M
H +M
≤
(H +M)(1 − 1
t
) +H +M
H +M
= 2−
1
t
Now assume that Ll + Ll > (H +M)(1−
1
t
). We have that, using Lemma 5.8:
OPT
R
≤
Ll + Ll +H +M
Ll + Ll +
H+M
t
<
(H +M)(1− 1
t
) +H +M
(H +M)(1 − 1
t
) + H+M
t
= 2−
1
t
.
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A Mechanisms for Multi-Parameter Domains
In this section we extend our technique of Section 3 to several multi-parameter settings and obtain
optimal auctions in these settings. We first set up a general framework that relates a linear program to
revenue maximizing mechanism design, then we explore specific settings with this perspective.
Any truthful-in-expectation mechanism M can be described by the following parameters: at a bid
vector v, M allocates to bidder i a fraction xi,S,v of each bundle S ⊆M , and charges him an expected
price pi,v. We want M to be feasible, individually rational and truthful-in-expectation, and maximize
the revenue. We use the following LP:
Maximize:
∑
v∈D PrD(v) · pi,v, s.t.
– ∀i,v ∈ Ti, S ⊆M :
∑
i xi,S,v ≤ 1
– ∀j ∈M,v ∈ T :
∑
i,j∈S xi,S,v ≤ 1
– ∀i, (vi,v−i) ∈ Ti, (v
′
i,v−i) ∈ Ti:∑
S⊆M
vi(S)xi,S,(vi,v−i) − pi,(vi,v−i) ≥
∑
S⊆M
vi(S)xi,S,(v′i,v−i) − pi,(v′i,v−i)
– ∀i,∀S ⊆M,v ∈ T : xi,S,v ≥ 0, pi,v ≥ 0
– ∀i,v−i ∈ D−i : pi,(0,v−i) = 0.
Definition A.1 Given a solution {xi,S,v, pi,v}i∈N,S⊆M,v∈T to the LP, we say that a mechanism M
α-decomposes the solution if, at each bid vector v ∈ Ti, for each bundle S and bidder i, M allocates
exactly xi,S,v fraction of bundle S to bidder i, and charges the bidder an expected price of pi,v. When α
is 1, we say that M decomposes the solution.
Observation A.2 If a mechanism M α-decomposes an optimal solution to the LP above, then M is
truthful-in-expectation and the revenue of M is at least an α-approximation to the optimal auction.
Proof of the observation is essentially the same as that of Theorem 3.1. The problem of designing
optimal mechanism, however, cannot be directly reduced to solving the LP. First, the number of variables
in the LP is exponential in m, and each truthfulness constraint involves exponentially many variables.
Second, even if we can solve the LP optimally, not all solutions can be decomposed by mechanisms.
An easy counterexample is when m = n = 3, where each bidder i single-mindedly demands the bundle
M\{i}, having a valuation of 1 for it. Let v be the only bid vector in this case, then the solution where
xi,M\{i},v =
1
2 , pi,v =
1
2 for all i is an optimal solution to the LP, but it is obvious that no mechanism
can decomose this solution.
In the following subsections, we show that we can overcome both obstacles for the settings of additive
valuations and unit-demand valuations.
A.1 Additive Valuations
In the additive domain, each bidder’s valuation vi is determined by his valuation of each item in M ,
and vi(S) for any S ⊆ M is simply
∑
j∈S vi(j). If we use xi,j,v to denote the fraction of item j being
assigned to bidder i at bid vector v, then
∑
S⊆M
xi,S,vvi(S) =
∑
S⊆M
xi,S,v
∑
j∈S
vi(j) =
∑
j∈M
vi(j)
∑
S∋j
xi,S,v =
∑
j∈M
vi(j)xi,j,v.
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Therefore we are able to express the truthful-in-expectation condition in the LP in terms of polynomially
many variables {xi,j,v, pi,v}i∈N,j∈M,v∈T . The feasibility constraints can also be easily expressed as
∀v ∈ T ,∀j ∈M,
∑
i
xi,j,v ≤ 1.
Additionally, we have that
∀i,∀j ∈M,∀v ∈ T , xi,j,v ≥ 0, pi,v ≥ 0;
∀i,∀v−i ∈ D−i, pi,(0,v−i) = 0,
then we have obtained a much smaller LP whose optimal solution has the same value as that of the
original LP. Fortunately, we are able to decompose a solution for the new LP by a mechanism: given
any feasible solution {xi,j,v, pi,v}i∈N,j∈M,v∈T for the LP, at bid vector v,
• if v is in T , for bidder i, if v−i is not in D−i, allocate nothing to i; otherwise allocate each
item j ∈ M with probability xi,j,v to bidder i. If bidder i gets item j, then charge him a price
pi,v ·
vi(j)∑
j′∈M vi(j)xi,j′,v
, otherwise charge him nothing for this item.
• if v is not in T , no bidder gets allocated anything, and no payment is made either.
It is obvious that the mechanism allocates the items according to xi,j,v’s. To see that it also charges
the right expected prices, just notice that at any bid vector v ∈ Ti, the expected price for bidder i is
∑
j∈M
xi,j,vpi,v ·
vi(j)∑
j′∈M vi(j
′)xi,j′,v
= pi,v.
Since we can solve the new LP efficiently, we have proved the following theorem:
Theorem A.3 For additive valuations, we can compute an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism
in time polynomial to the number of bidders, the number of items, and the size of the support of the
valuation distribution.
A.2 Unit Demand Valuations
In this domain, each bidder i has a valuation vi(j) for each item j ∈ M , and his valuation of a bundle
S ⊆ M is maxj∈M vi(j). Therefore, each vi(·) can also be described by a vector vi ∈ R
m. For this
domain we prove the following theorem:
Theorem A.4 For unit demand valuations, we can compute an optimal truthful-in-expectation mech-
anism in time polynomial to the number of bidders, the number of items, and the size of the support of
the valuation distribution.
Since each bidder does not distinguish a bundle S of size larger than 1 and the item in S that he
values most, it is without loss of generality to assume that a mechanism allocates only bundles of size
at most 1. Therefore in the LP, we have only variables xi,j,v for all i ∈ N , j ∈ M and v ∈ T , which
allows us to solve the LP efficiently. Therefore it remains only to design a mechanism that implements
a solution to the LP.
We observe that every solution to the LP can be described by a set of matrices {Xv}v∈T , where
for each v, Xv is a n ×m matrix whose entries are nonnegative and satisfy the following constraints:
(i) for each row i ∈ N ,
∑
j∈M Xi,j ≤ 1; (ii) for each column j ∈ M ,
∑
i∈M Xi,j ≤ 1. To implement a
solution means that for every v ∈ D, the mechanism allocates item j to bidder i with probability Xvi,j,
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and in each realization, no bidder should get more than one item; in other words, each realization of
the mechanism should be a n×m matrix whose entries are from {0, 1}, subject to the same constraints
(i)(ii). The problem therefore boils down to expressing a matrix in Rn×m satisfying (i)(ii) as a convex
combination of matrices in {0, 1}n×m.
When m equals n, and if all constraints (i)(ii) hold with equality, then the problem is exactly
expressing a doubly stochastic matrix by a convex combination of permutation matrices. This is exactly
what the classical Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem tells us:
Theorem A.5 (Birkhoff-von Neumann) Given any n×n doubly stochastic matrix, we can write it
as a convex combination of permutation matrices, and the coefficients can be computed in time polyno-
mial in n.
Therefore, if we can extend a general n ×m matrices that satisfy constraints (i)(ii) to some larger
doubly stochastic matrix in polynomial time, then we would be able to implement any LP solution.
This is exactly what we are going to do, which completes the proof of Theorem A.4.
Lemma A.6 Given any n×m matrix A whose entries are nonnegative real numbers that satisfy
∀i ∈ [n],
∑
j
Aij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [m],
∑
i
Aij ≤ 1,
we can output in polynomial time a square matrix A′ that is doubly stochastic, and the submatrix
consisting of its first n rows and m columns is identical with A.
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose n ≤ m. We first make it an m × m square matrix by
appending m− n all zero rows. Abusing the notation, we still call it A, as it still satisfies the condition
in the theorem. Then we expand the matrix to a 2m×2m matrix B, which has four m×m submatrices.
Therefore B =
[
A1 A2
A3 A4
]
. We specify the four submatrices and show that B is doubly stochastic.
We let A1 be A itself, and A4 be A
T , the transpose of A. Let A2 be a diagonal matrix, whose i-th
element on the diagonal is 1 −
∑m
j=1Ai,j; similarly, let A3 be a diagonal matrix, whose j-th element
on the diagonal is 1 −
∑m
i=1Ai,j . It is then obvious that for the first m rows and first m columns
of B, the sum of elements in each of them is 1. For any of the last m rows, the sum of the elements is
1−
∑m
j=1Ai,j +
∑m
j=1Ai,j = 1. The same argument shows that the sum of elements in each of the last
m columns is also 1. This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.3 OXS Valuations
In this domain, each bidder’s valuation vi can be described by a bipartite graph (V,E) with non-negative
edge weights. The vertex set V is partitioned into two sets: the set M of items, and a set C whose
elements are called clauses. Edges go from items to clauses. For a bundle B ⊆M , the valuation vi(B)
is defined to be the sum of edge weights in a maximum-weight matching of the induced subgraph on
B ∪C. This class includes both additive valuations (the special case that the graph is a matching from
M to C) and unit-demand valuations (the special case that the set C consists of a single element). We
can interpret each clause in C as a demand that the bidder wishes to satisfy using a single element of
M . The value of satisfying a clause depends on the element that is used to satisfy it, and the value of
satisfying a set of clauses is the combined value of satisfying each one of them. We then interpret the
value of a bundle to be the maximum value that can be achieved by satisfying a subset of clauses using
distinct elements of the bundle.
Definition A.7 A type distribution is simple if its support consists of only two types — denoted by
vL, vH — that satisfy vL(B) ≤ vH(B) for every bundle B.
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Lemma A.8 Consider a simple type distribution with Pr(vL) = πL and Pr(vH) = πH = 1 − πL. Fix
two distributions DL,DH over bundles. There exists a truthful-in-expectation mechanism mapping ti to
Di for i ∈ {L,H}, if and only if vL(DL)+ vH(DH) ≥ vL(DH)+ vH(DL). If the set of such mechanisms
is nonempty, then the optimal revenue of any such mechanism (subject to individual rationality) is given
by the formula
OptRev(DL,DH) = vL(DL)− πHvH(DL) + πHvH(DH).
Proof: If vL(DL)+vH(DH) < vL(DH)+vH(DL) then any mechanism mapping ti to Di for i ∈ {L,H}
violates weak monotonicity and is consequently not truthful in expectation. Otherwise, consider the
posted-price mechanism with prices
pL = vL(DL)
pH = vH(DH)− vH(DL) + vL(DL).
At these prices, type vL gets zero utility from receiving DL and paying pL, but the utility from receiving
DH and paying pH is non-positive by weak monotonicity. Hence truthful bidding is weakly dominant for
vL. Type vH gets utility vH(DL)−vL(DL) regardless of whether her bid is vH or vL; this is non-negative
by our assumption of a simple type distribution. Hence our posted-price mechanism satisfies individual
rationality and incentive compatibility.
The revenue of our mechanism is
(1− πH)vL(DL) + πH(vH(DH)− vH(DL) + vL(DL)) = vL(DL)− πHvH(DL) + πHvH(DH).
To see that this is optimal, consider any other mechanism with allocation rule ti 7→ Di and prices p
′
L, p
′
H .
Individual rationality implies p′L ≤ pL. Incentive compatibility implies p
′
H ≤ p
′
L + vH(DH) − vH(DL),
and the right side is less than or equal to pH because p
′
L ≤ pL = vL(DL).
Lemma A.9 When the type distribution is simple, an optimal mechanism must give vH its utility
maximizing bundle and must give vL the bundle B that maximizes vL(B)−πHvH(B). In particular, for
simple type distributions there is always an optimal mechanism that is deterministic.
Proof: Immediate from the formula for OptRev(DL,DH).
Theorem A.10 Let V be a class of valuation functions that is closed under scalar multiplication and
such that the problem of maximizing f(B)−g(B) (f, g ∈ V) is NP-hard, even when restricted to instances
such that maxB 6=∅{f(B)/g(B)} is between 1 and 2
poly(n). Then it is NP-hard to design optimal truthful-
in-expectation mechanisms for one bidder with a simple type distribution over valuations in V.
Proof: Given f, g ∈ V let λ = maxB 6=∅{f(B)/g(B)}. Assume 1 ≤ λ ≤ 2
poly(n). Define types vL, vH
such that vL(B) = f(B) and vH(B) = λg(B) for all B. Set πH = λ
−1 and πL = 1− πH . Our definition
of λ ensures that this type distribution is simple. We have seen in Lemma A.9 that constructing an
optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism is equivalent to finding the bundles BL, BH that maximize
vH(BH) = λg(BH)
and
vL(BL)− πHvH(BL) = f(BL)− g(BL).
In particular, constructing an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism requires maximizing f(BL)−
g(BL), which by hypothesis is NP-hard.
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Theorem A.11 It is NP-hard to design an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism for OXS bidders,
even when there is a single bidder with a simple type distribution.
Proof: By Theorem A.10, it suffices to prove that the problem of maximizing f(B)− g(B) when f, g
belong to OXS is NP-hard. To do so, we reduce from Clique. Suppose we are given an undirected graph
G = (V,E) with n vertices and m edges, and we wish to decide if it contains a k-clique. Let the items
be edges of G and let the valuation functions be specified as follows.
f(B) = min
{
|B|,
(
k
2
)}
g(B) = max{|A| : A ⊆ B, every connected component of A is either acyclic or unicyclic}.
(Recall that a unicyclic graph is one that has exactly one simple cycle. Equivalently, it is a connected
graph with p vertices and p edges, for some p.) Both of these are OXS valuation functions. Valuation f
is represented by
(
k
2
)
clauses, each of which assigns value 1 to every edge of G. Valuation g is represented
by n clauses, each of which is associated to a vertex v of G and assigns value 1 to every edge incident
to v.
If G contains a k-clique then the edges of this k-clique form a bundle such that f(B) − g(B) =(
k
2
)
− k =
(
k−1
2
)
. Conversely, if G contains an edge set B such that f(B) − g(B) ≥
(
k−1
2
)
then we
may assume without loss of generality that |B| ≤
(
k
2
)
. If the graph H = (V,B) has any connected
component that is a tree, then we can remove the edges of this tree from B without changing the
value of f(B) − g(B). Consequently, we can assume without loss of generality that every connected
component of H other than isolated vertices contains a unicyclic subgraph. Then g(B) is the number
of non-isolated vertices in H. The relation g(B) = f(B) − (f(B) − g(B)) ≤
(
k
2
)
−
(
k−1
2
)
= k implies
that H has at most k non-isolated vertices. Let p be the number of such vertices, and let H0 denote
the induced subgraph on these p vertices. The graph H0 has p ≤ k vertices and p+
(
k−1
2
)
edges, which
can only happen if p = k and H0 is a k-clique.
A.4 Single Parameter Domains
In this section, we show that in single-dimensional settings the problem of designing revenue maximizing
truthful-in-expectation mechanisms can be reduced to finding an outcome that maximizes the social
welfare.
Definition A.12 In a single-dimensional setting, each bidder i’s type is represented by a real number vi,
and for each outcome ω ∈ Ω, there is a constant αi,ω such that bidder i’s valuation for ω is vi · αi,ω.
For example, for combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders with known bundles, each bidder
has a publicly known bundle Si ⊆ M , where M is the set of items being sold. Each outcome ω is a
partition (T1, T2, · · · , Tn) of M . Then αi,ω is 1 if and only if Ti ⊇ Si, and 0 otherwise. Then each
bidder’s type is expressed by vi, his valuation of any bundle that includes Si.
Theorem A.13 In a single-dimensional setting, if there is an oracle that solves the social welfare
maximization problem, then one can compute a revenue maximizing, truthful-in-expectation, ex-post IR
mechanism in the explicit model.
Proof: In a single-dimensional setting, the type of bidders can be represented by a vector v, where
vi represents bidder i’s type. Let D be the support of the type distribution, and denote by PrD(v) the
probability of v occurring. Let D−i be {v−i | v ∈ D}, Ti be {vi | ∃v−i s.t. (vi,v−i) ∈ D}, and T be
∪iTi.
16
For any randomized mechanism, given a bidding vector v, it will output outcome ω with probability
xv,ω, and charge bidder i an expected price pi,v.
By a similar argument as that in Section 3, we can solve the optimal mechanism design problem if
we could solve the following linear program:
max
∑
v∈D PrD(v)
∑
i pi,v
∑
ω∈Ω xv,ω ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ D
vi
∑
ω∈Ω αi,ωxv,ω − pi,v ≥ vi
∑
ω∈Ω αi,ωx(v′i,v−i),ω − pi,(v′i,v−i), ∀i,∀v ∈ D,∀v
′
i ∈ Ti
pi,(0,v−i) = 0, ∀i,∀v−i ∈ D−i
xv,ω ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀v ∈ D
pi,v ≥ 0, ∀i,∀v ∈ D
If we can optimally solve the LP, we can run a mechanism that outputs ω∗ at a bid vector v with
probability xv,ω∗ , and charges bidder i a payment of pi,v ·
x
v,ω∗αi,ω∗∑
ω∈Ω xv,ωαi,ω
. As we will show below, the LP
can be solved in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method, therefore the sum in the denominator has
only polynomially many nonzero entries, and hence can be computed efficiently.
Since Ω can be exponentially large, the LP above may involve exponentially many variables, but it
has only polynomially many constraints. Writing out its dual, we get
min γ
γ +
∑
i viαi,ω(yi,v −
∑
v′i∈Ti\{vi}
yi,(v′i,v−i)) ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ T ,∀ω ∈ Ω
zi,v −
∑
v′i∈Ti\{vi}
zi,(v′i,v−i) ≥ PrD(v), ∀i,∀v ∈ T , s.t. vi 6= 0
yi,v ≥ 0, ∀i,∀v ∈ D
zi,v ≥ 0, ∀i,∀v ∈ D
γ ≥ 0
The dual has polynomially many variables but exponentially many constraints. As long as there is
a separation oracle, we can solve the dual. Since there are only polynomially many constraints in the
second group, it suffices to give a separation oracle for the first group. Since there are only polynomially
many v ∈ D, this boils to the problem where given any v ∈ D and γ, we are asked whether there is an
ω ∈ Ω such that
∑
i
vi

 ∑
v′i∈Ti\{vi}
yi,(v′i,v−i) − yi,v

αi,ω > γ.
This problem, however, can be solved by an oracle that, given a bid vector, outputs an outcome
that maximizes the social welfare — feed the oracle with a bidding vector where bidder i’s type is
vi
(∑
v′i∈Ti\{vi}
yi,(v′i,v−i) − yi,v
)
, and the left hand side becomes the social welfare of outcome ω. If the
ω that the oracle returns has social welfare at most γ, then no constraint for this v is violated, otherwise
we find a violated constraint. This completes the proof.
We remark that the social welfare maximization oracle in the theorem should be powerful enough
that even when bidders’ valuations are negative, it should still be able to output the best outcome. This
requirement is no stricter than that in Myerson’s original reduction for single item auctions, as in that
case one may have negative virtual valuations.
B Appendix for Section 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proof consists of the following lemmas.
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Lemma B.1 The algorithm is feasible, individually rational and truthful in expectation.
Proof: If ~v ∈ T then feasibility is ensured by the conditions of the LP. If ~v /∈ T then at most one
bidder is allocated the item (with probability smaller than 1) and hence the algorithm is truthful.
To see that the algorithm is individually rational, assume that bidder i wins the item and that his
payment is
pi,~v
xi,~v
. By the constraints of the LP we have that xi,~v · vi − pi,~v ≥ 0, since (0, ~v−i) ∈ D. Hence
vi ≥
pi,~v
xi,~v
as needed.
We now show that the algorithm is truthful in expectation. Consider bidder i. If v−i /∈ D−i bidder
i never receives the item regardless of his value vi. Hence assume that v−i ∈ Di. Bidder i wins the item
with probability xi,~v and his payment in this case is
pi,~v
xi,~v
. Thus the expected profit of bidder i when he
declares his true value is xi,~v · vi− pi,~v. We now show that the profit of i is not bigger when he declares
any other value v′i. We assume that v ∈ T : otherwise by the definition of the algorithm bidder i is
facing several alternatives that their price does not depend on i’s value and taking the most profitable
one, and truthfulness is obvious in that case.
Suppose that (v′i, v−i) ∈ T . In this case, similarly to before, the profit of bidder i is xi,(v′i,v−i) · vi −
pi,(v′i,v−i). By the constraints of the LP we have that xi,~v · vi− pi,~v ≥ xi,(v′i,v−i) · vi− pi,(v′i,v−i), as needed.
Now suppose that (v′i, v−i) /∈ T . Let w = argmaxv′i∈Vi xi,(v′i,v−i) · v
′
i− pi,(v′i,v−i). The profit of i when
declaring v′i is xi,(w,v−i) · vi − pi,(w,v−i) which is at most, by the constraints of the LP, his profit from
declaring his true value vi (i.e., xi,~v · vi − pi,~v).
The following lemma is straightforward, since the size of the LP is polynomial in the size of T , which
is polynomial in the size of D:
Lemma B.2 The algorithm runs in time polynomial in the size of D.
Lemma B.3 The expected revenue of the algorithm (over D) equals the optimal value of the linear pro-
gram. In addition, the optimal value of the linear program equals the revenue of the optimal (individually
rational) truthful in expectation mechanism.
Proof: Given that the valuation profile is ~v ∈ D, the expected payment from each bidder i is
xi,~v ·
pi,~v
xi,~v
= pi,~v. Thus the expected revenue of the algorithm (where the expectation is taken over D) is
exactly the optimal value of the linear program:
∑
~v∈D PrD[~v]
∑
i p~v.
We now prove the second statement. Consider the revenue maximizing, individually rational, truthful
in expectation mechanism for D. Set the variables of the linear program: for each ~v ∈ T , set xi,~v be
the probability that i receives the item given that the valuation profile is ~v, and let pi,~v be his expected
payment in case the valuation profile is ~v. Notice that the linear program is feasible (the item is allocated
to only one bidder so
∑
i xi,~v ≤ 1) and that the expected revenue equals the objective function of the
linear program.
C Appendix for Section 4
C.1 Correctness of the Algorithm in Section 4.1
The proof consists of the following claims.
Claim C.1 For each bidder i, the labels of the interval [0, 1] are increasing. Moreover, suppose that
bidder i with valuation vi is assigned a fraction x of the item in M , then all labels in [0, x] are at most
vi, and all labels in (x, 1] are at least vi.
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Proof: By definition of Riv−i , x is equal to x
i
k for some k. The expected price for bidder i in M is
therefore pik. Let v
′
i be such that M(v
′
i, v−i) = x
i
k−1, and let the expected price in this case be p
′i
k . Let
v′′i be such that M(v
′′
i , v−i) = x
i
k+1, and the expected price in this case be p
′i
k . From the definition of
truthfulness, we have:
vi · x
i
k − p
i
k ≥ vi · x
i
k+1 − p
i
k+1, vi · x
i
k − p
i
k ≥ vi · x
i
k−1 − p
i
k−1.
Rearranging the inequalities, we get:
pik+1 − p
i
k
xik+1 − x
i
k
≥ vi ≥
pik − p
i
k−1
xik − x
i
k−1
.
The claim follows by inductively applying the claim for each two consecutive intervals.
Claim C.2 The mechanism M ′ the algorithm produces is universally truthful.
Proof: Observe that after choosing r, M ′ elicits bids, and then makes an allocation decision and
a take-it-or-leave-it offer for each bidder, where the price for bidder i does not depend on bidder i’s
valuation but only on v−i and r (by Claim C.1 if bidder i is assigned the item then vi−p ≥ 0, otherwise
vi−p ≤ 0). Notice that when a bidder has a zero profit from taking the item we can break ties arbitrarily
without affecting truthfulness. Hence, for each r the algorithm is truthful. Since we choose r in a way
that is independent of the bids, M ′ is a universally truthful mechanism.
Claim C.3 M ′ implements M.
Proof: Suppose that bidder i with value vi is assigned x and his payment is p in M . By definition
(x, p) is equal to some (xik, p
i
k) ∈ R
i
v−i
. In the algorithm, it is easy to see that the probability that
bidder i is assigned the item is exactly x. The expected payment of bidder i is:
pi1
xi1
· xi1 +
pi2 − p
i
1
xi2 − x
i
1
· (xi2 − x
i
1) + · · · +
pik − p
i
k−1
xik − x
i
k−1
· (xik − x
i
k−1) = p
k
i = p.
Claim C.4 M ′ is feasible.
Proof: Given valuations (v1, v2), suppose that M assigns fractions x and y to the two bidders,
respectively, then by the feasibility of M , x + y ≤ 1. Therefore, bidder 2 is assigned the item exactly
when 1− r ≤ y, i.e., r ≥ 1− y ≥ x, which is the condition that bidder 1 is not assigned the item. This
guarantees the feasibility of M ′.
We have proved correctness of the algorithm in Section 4.1. Now we extend it to a procedure for
the case when Riv−i ’s can be infinite.
Similarly to the algorithm presented in Section 4.1, the mechanism first chooses a number r ∈ [0, 1]
uniformly at random. For every value of r, we have a deterministic mechanism as follows:
1. Elicit a bid from each bidder. Let the bids be (v1, v2).
2. If r ≤M(v1, v2)1, allocate the item to bidder 1; if 1−r < M(v1, v2)2, allocate the item to bidder 2.
3. By the characterization of individually rational truthful mechanisms in this setting, the payment
of the bidder who gets the item is determined by the monotone allocation rule specified in the last
step — if bidder 1 gets the item, he makes the payment inf{v1 |M(v1, v2)1 > r}; if bidder 2 gets
the item, he makes the payment inf{v2 |M(v1, v2)2 > 1− r}.
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By similar arguments as in the previous claims, for every value of r this deterministic mechanism
is truthful and feasible. We therefore obtain a distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms,
i.e., a universally truthful mechanism. This mechanism implements the allocation rule of M , and by
the uniqueness of payment scheme for individually rational truthful mechanisms, the payment of M is
implemented as well.
We note that the algorithm presented in Section 4.1 for the finite case is a special case of the procedure
presented above. We presented it in an apparently different way simply to make the algorithm more
explicit and to make it clear that its running time is polynomially bounded in that case.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
We further remark that for a truthful-in-expectation mechanism M that is not IR and pi0 is not 0,
we can still find a universally truthful mechanism that implements it. We simply change the labels to
be
pik+1+p
i
0−p
i
k
xik+1−x
i
k
, and the rest of the argument (except Claim C.1) goes through.
C.2 More on Implementability
Theorem C.5 In a single item auction for n bidders, if each bidder has at most two possible values
then every truthful in expectation mechanism can be implemented by a universally truthful mechanism.
Proof: Let bidder i’s two values be ℓi and hi, with ℓi < hi. We construct a graph G whose nodes
are all possible bid vectors, i.e., each node v is labeled (αi)i, where αi is from {ℓi, hi}. There is an edge
between two nodes if their labels differ in exactly one coordinate. We then add some dummy nodes
to G: for each node v = (αi)i where |{i | αi = hi}| = k, add k dummy nodes and identify each one with
bidder i for which αi = hi in v. Add an edge between v and each of the dummy nodes. These dummy
nodes have no other edges, and therefore have degree 1. Observe that G is a bipartite graph.
We will show that every integral matchings in G corresponds to a truthful deterministic mechanisms.
Furthermore, we will show that a fractional matching corresponds to a truthful-in-expectation mecha-
nisms. The theorem will then follow since it is known that a fractional matching can be ”decomposed”
to a probability distribution over integral matchings in a bipartite graph (see below).
Observe that every matching M in G corresponds to a deterministic truthful mechanism: for each
bid vector, consider the corresponding node in G. If it is not matched to any other node, then allocate
nothing; if it is matched to a dummy node, then allocate the item to bidder i if the dummy node
corresponds to i (bidder i’s value must be hi in this case); otherwise, v is matched to a node corresponding
to v′, then allocate the item to bidder i where i is the coordinate where v and v′ differs. The mechanism
is feasible. To check truthfulness we show that the algorithm is monotone: if bidder i’s value is ℓi in
v and i gets the item, then v is matched to v′ and the two differ only in coordinate i; therefore, if, all
other bids fixed, his value changes to hi, he still gets the item.
The next observation we make is that any truthful-in-expectation mechanism M corresponds to a
fractional matching in G in a similar way. Suppose at bid vector v, M allocates a fraction x of the item
to bidder i. Let v′ be the bid vector that differs from v only at coordinate i and suppose M allocates
fraction y of the item to i at v′. If vi is ℓi, then add x fraction of the edge (v, v
′) to the fractional
matching. Otherwise add x− y fraction of the edge from v to the dummy node corresponding to the hi
in v. We are guaranteed that x− y is nonnegative by the monotonicity of M . We also know that the
total weight of all edges incident to a node does not exceed 1 by the feasibility of M . Hence we get a
fractional matching on G.
We note that the correspondences described in the preceding two paragraphs are inverse to each
other. In other words, given any matching M in G, if we first map it to the corresponding deterministic
truthful mechanism, and then map the mechanism back as a matching in G, then we getM back. There-
fore, we have established a one-to-one correspondence between all deterministic truthful mechanisms
and all matchings in G. Furthermore, this correspondence is “linear”, in the sense that if a fractional
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matching in G corresponds to a TIE mechanism M and can be expressed as a convex combination
of a set of matchings in G, then M can be expressed as the convex combination of the deterministic
truthful mechanisms corresponding to these matchings, with the same linear coefficients. Expressing
a TIE mechanism as a convex combination of deterministic truthful mechanisms, however, is exactly
what we mean by implementing a TIE mechanism using universally truthful mechanism. The problem
then boils down to decomposing a fractional matching in a bipartite graph as a convex combination
of matchings on the same graph — Theorem A.5 and Lemma A.6 say exactly that this can always be
done, which concludes the proof.
D A gap between truthful-in-expectation and deterministic truthful
mechanisms
This section describes a 3-bidder distribution whose optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism is not
deterministic. We furthermore prove that the revenue of this mechanism exceeds the revenue of the
optimal deterministic truthful mechanism by a factor of at least 1.001.
D.1 Description of the example
The joint distribution of type profiles is supported on a 27-element subset of R3. Each column of the
following matrix represents a type profile in the support of the distribution.

 9 9 9 9 10 11 9 10 119 9 10 11 9 9 11 9 10
10 11 9 9 9 9 10 11 9


Each of these nine type profiles has probability 4126 . In addition, for each type profile obtained by taking
a column of the above matrix and increasing exactly one of its entries to 20, the probability of that type
profile is 5126 . The number of such type profiles is 18, so their total probability is 18 · (5/126) = 90/126.
Combined with the matrix columns themselves, whose probabilities sum up to 9 · (4/126) = 36/126, we
see that the given probabilities sum up to 1, meaning that they constitute a valid joint distribution.
We assume that bidders are numbered 1, 2, 3, and that bidder indices are interpreted modulo 3; for
example, if i = 3 then bidder i + 1 refers to bidder 1. Let (v1, v2, v3) denote the profile of bids. An
optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism MTIE can be described as follows.
1. If max{v1, v2, v3} ≥ 20 then we give the item to the lowest-numbered bidder whose bid is at least
20.
2. Else, if 10 ≤ max{v1, v2, v3} < 20, then bidder i’s probability of winning is equal to 1/2 if the
other pair of bids (vi−1, vi+1) belongs to the following set of ordered pairs: {(9, 9), (9, 10), (11, 9)}.
Otherwise, bidder i’s probability of winning is zero.
3. If max{v1, v2, v3} < 10 then no one wins.
A case analysis reveals that the probabilities never sum to more than 1, and that for every bidder i, for
every profile of the other bids v−i, the probability of winning is monotonically non-decreasing in vi.
D.2 A linear program that eliminates payment variables
We begin by modifying the linear program from Section 3 to eliminate the payment variables and obtain
an equivalent linear program whose only variables represent the allocation function. The fact that this
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is possible is a manifestation of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, but it can also be proven by a direct
manipulation of the linear program.
Maximizing revenue in a truthful-in-expectation mechanism is equivalent to solving a linear program
specified below, where subscript i ranges over bidders (i.e. i = 1, 2, 3) and subscript s ranges over
“scenarios”, i.e. bid profiles in the product of the supports of each bidder’s distribution. Define a
relation RB(i, s, t) to mean that s, t are two scenarios and that t is obtained from s by increasing (or
preserving) player i’s bid while leaving the other players’ bids fixed.
In the original LP, we have variables xis to denote the probability that bidder i gets the item in
scenario s. We replace these variables by yis’s that represent increments in xis when bidder i’s bid
increases (with the other bids fixed), so that for each s and i, xis =
∑
t:RB(i,s,t) yit. Therefore, by
requiring yis to be nonnegative for each s, we guarantee the monotonicity of the mechanism. The
feasibility condition
∑
i xis ≤ 1 can be directly translated as
∑
i,t:RB(i,t,s) yit ≤ 1.
In order to have an LP for the maximum revenue, we still need to specify payments. In the following
we show that, given yis’s, we can express the maximum revenue achievable without introducing new
variables. 10
Suppose vis denotes the valuation of bidder i in scenario s. When vis is 0, by individual rationality
we know that the expected payment pis is 0. Let s
′ be the scenario in which bidder i has increased his
bid to the next larger value in the support while all other bids remain unchanged. By truthfulness we
have xis′vis′−pis′ ≥ xisvis′−pis, i.e., pis′ ≤ vis′(xis′−xis)+pis = vis′yis′ . Inductively, for any scenario t
we have that pit ≤
∑
s:R(i,s,t) visyis. Therefore, the revenue of the mechanism can be no larger than if
we simply set the expected payments in scenario t to be
∑
s:R(i,s,t) visyis. It is easy to check that this
payment scheme satisfies individual rationality conditions and the other truthful conditions. Therefore
this payment scheme gives the maximum revenue under yis’s, and we can express the revenue as∑
s,i
πs
∑
t:RB(i,t,s)
vityit,
where πs denotes the probability of scenario s.
11
To simplify notation, we define
ψis = vis ·

 ∑
t:RB(i,s,t)
πt

 ,
and change the order of summations, the new objective function can be expressed as
∑
i,s ψisyis.
Now we write out the full new LP, which we have shown to give the maximum revenue of truthful-
in-expectation mechanisms:
max
∑
i,s ψisyis
s.t.
∑
i,s:RB(i,s,t) yis ≤ 1 ∀t
yis ≥ 0 ∀i, s
The dual is the following linear program.
min
∑
t zt
s.t.
∑
t:RB(i,s,t) zt ≥ ψis ∀i, s
zt ≥ 0 ∀t
10This is in essence a rederivation of a characterization result from Myerson in the discrete case.
11One way of making these payments ex post individually rational is to charge a random amount to player i. Conditional
on i winning in scenario t, the amount vis is charged with probability yis/xit for every s such that RB(i, s, t).
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D.3 Analysis of the example
For the distribution specified in Section D.1, the optimal primal and dual solutions are specified as
follows. For notational convenience, we use a, b, c, d to denote 9, 10, 11, 20, respectively. Thus, for
example y2,adc would denote the variable yis for bidder i = 2 in scenario s = (a, d, c) = (9, 20, 11). Also
for convenience, we will only specify the nonzero yis and zt variables.
The primal solution has 27 nonzero values. Nine of them are:
y2,aab = y3,aab = y1,aba = y2,aba = y1,baa = y3,baa = y1,aac = y2,caa = y3,aca = 1/2 (1)
In addition, for every scenario s in which player i’s bid is 20, the primal variable yis is equal to 1− (yit+
yiu + yiv), where t, u, v are obtained from s by changing player i’s bid to 9, 10, 11, respectively. Thus,
y1,daa = y1,dac = y1,dba = y2,ada = y2,cda = y2,adb = y3,aad = y3,acd = y3,bad = 1/2
y1,dab = y1,dca = y1,dcb = y2,bda = y2,adc = y2,bdc = y3,abd = y3,cad = y3,cbd = 1
The dual solution has 27 nonzero values, one for each scenario. Nine of them are:
zaab = zaba = zbaa = zaac = zaca = zcaa =
15
126
zacb = zbac = zcba =
2
126
In addition, for every scenario s in which one player’s bid was raised to 20, the dual variable zs is equal
to 100126 .
It remains to check that these primal and dual solutions are feasible, that they satisfy both primal
and dual complementary slackness, and that the primal solution y is the unique solution satisfying
complementary slackness with respect to z. (This last step is necessary in order to substantiate the
claim that there is no deterministic truthful mechanism which gets as much revenue.)
Primal feasibility and primal complementary slackness are easy to check. To verify dual feasibility
and dual complementary slackness, we need to check 192 constraints (3 players times 64 scenarios) and
we do it using a five-case analysis.
Case 1: Pairs i, s such that at least one bid in s is equal to 20. The value of ψis is equal
to kis · vis ·
(
5
126
)
, where kis denotes the number of scenarios t such that RB(i, s, t) holds. The value of∑
t:RB(i,s,t) zt is kis ·
100
126 . Since vis ≤ 20 for all i, s, we see that these constraints are always satisfied,
and that the tight constraints are precisely those with kis = 0 or vis = 20.
Case 2: All other pairs i, s such that yis > 0. There are 9 remaining pairs i, s such that yis > 0,
and they break up into 3 orbits under the action of the symmetry group that cyclically permutes
the bidders’ identities. It suffices to check one representative of each of these orbits, for example the
constraints corresponding to primal variables y2,aab, y3,aab, y1,aac. These constraints are
ψ2,aab = zaab + zacb + zadb
ψ3,aab = zaab + zaac + zaad
ψ1,aac = zaac + zbac + zdac
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We now compute that
ψ2,aab = 9 ·
(
4
126
+
4
126
+
5
126
)
= 9 ·
4 + 4 + 5
126
=
117
126
zaab + zacb + zadb =
15
126
+
2
126
+
100
126
=
117
126
ψ3,aab = 10 ·
(
4
126
+
4
126
+
5
126
)
= 10 ·
4 + 4 + 5
126
=
130
126
zaab + zaac + zaad =
15
126
+
15
126
+
100
126
=
130
126
ψ1,aac = 9 ·
(
4
126
+
4
126
+
5
126
)
= 9 ·
4 + 4 + 5
126
=
117
126
zaac + zbac + zdac =
15
126
+
2
126
+
100
126
=
117
126
,
which confirms dual feasibility and complementary slackness in these cases.
Case 3: All remaining pairs (i, s) such that πs > 0. When all bids are less than 20, there are
only nine scenarios s such that πs > 0, namely the nine columns of the matrix above. For each column
of the matrix there are three choices of i, making for 27 pairs (i, s) in total. However, 9 of these pairs
were checked in Case 2 above. This leaves 18 pairs that form 6 orbits under the action of the cyclic
symmetry group. The following list of 6 constraints contains one representative of each orbit.
ψ1,aab ≤ zaab + zdab
ψ2,aac ≤ zaac + zadc
ψ3,aac ≤ zaac + zaad
ψ1,acb ≤ zacb + zdcb
ψ2,acb ≤ zacb + zadb
ψ3,acb ≤ zacb + zacd
The left sides of these 6 constraints are computed as follows.
ψ1,aab = 9 ·
(
4
126
+
5
126
)
=
81
126
ψ2,aac = 9 ·
(
4
126
+
5
126
)
=
81
126
ψ3,aac = 11 ·
(
4
126
+
5
126
)
=
99
126
ψ1,acb = 9 ·
(
4
126
+
5
126
)
=
81
126
ψ2,acb = 11 ·
(
4
126
+
5
126
)
=
99
126
ψ3,acb = 10 ·
(
4
126
+
5
126
)
=
90
126
Note that the left side of each constraint is at most 99126 . The right side of each constraint is at least
102
126 , because in each of the six constraints, the first term on the right side is at least
2
126 and the second
term is equal to 100126 . Therefore, each of the six constraints holds, which completes Case 3.
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Case 4: Pairs (i, s) such that πs = 0 but ψis > 0. If ψis > 0 then there is a scenario t such
that πt > 0 and RB(i, s, t) holds. Consider the least such t, i.e. the one obtained from s by raising i’s
bid by the minimum amount. Then ψit = ψis · (vit/vis) > ψis. As πt > 0, we have already verified the
constraint
∑
u:RB(i,t,u) zu ≥ ψit in one of the earlier cases. Now it follows that
∑
u:RB(i,s,u) zu > ψis, i.e.
the dual constraint indexed by (i, s) holds and it is not tight.
Case 5: Pairs (i, s) such that ψis = 0. In this case, it trivially holds that ψis ≤
∑
t:RB(i,s,t) zt,
with equality if and only if all of the dual variables in the sum on the right are zero.
We are now in a position to prove that every optimal primal solution satisfies (1). The dual vari-
ables zt are strictly positive for every t ∈ {aab, aba, baa, aac, aca, caa, acb, bac, cba}. Via complementary
slackness, this gives nine equations that must be satisfied by every optimal primal solution.
∑
i,s:RB(i,s,t)
yis = 1 ∀t ∈ {aab, aba, baa, aac, aca, caa, acb, bac, cba}. (2)
Of the primal variables yis that participate in these nine linear equations, many of them are required, by
complementary slackness, to take the value 0 at any optimal primal solution because the corresponding
dual constraint is not tight. We can determine which of the relevant variables yis are allowed to
take a nonzero value by reviewing the case analysis above. If (i, s) satisfies RB(i, s, t) for some t ∈
{aab, aba, baa, aac, aca, caa, acb, bac, cba}, then ψis > 0 and no bid in s is equal to 20. This excludes
Cases 5 and 1, respectively. None of the dual constraints in Cases 3 and 4 are tight, so none of the
corresponding variables yis can take a nonzero value. This leaves Case 2, which corresponds to the nine
variables occurring in (1). Rewriting the system of linear equations (2) in terms of these nine variables,
we obtain the linear system


1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1




y2,aab
y3,aab
y1,aac
y3,baa
y1,baa
y2,caa
y1,aba
y2,aba
y3,aca


=


1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1


(3)
The matrix on the left side is invertible, so the unique solution of the linear system is the one given
in (1).
D.4 Bounding the integrality gap
Going a step further, we can bound the integrality gap in this example by observing that integer solutions
of the primal LP must satisfy an additional constraint. The key observation is that the constraints of
the primal LP imply the relation


1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1




y2,aab
y3,aab
y1,aac
y3,baa
y1,baa
y2,caa
y1,aba
y2,aba
y3,aca





1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1


(4)
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which is obtained by taking the 9× 9 submatrix of the LP constraint matrix whose rows are indexed by
scenarios aab, aac, bac, baa, caa, cba, aba, aca, acb, in that order, and whose columns are indexed by the
nine variables that appear in the column vector on the left side of the inequality. Multiplying the left
and right sides of (4) by the row vector (12 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2), we obtain
y2,aab + y3,aab + y1,aac + y3,baa + y1,baa + y2,caa + y1,aba + y2,aba + y3,aca ≤
9
2
.
Together with the constraints yis ∈ Z for all i, s, this implies the stronger inequality
y2,aab + y3,aab + y1,aac + y3,baa + y1,baa + y2,caa + y1,aba + y2,aba + y3,aca ≤ 4. (5)
If we add this constraint into the primal LP, it modifies the dual by adding an extra variable ζ that
enters the dual objective function with coefficient 4, and that enters various dual constraints (those
corresponding to primal variables occurring in (5)) with coefficient 1. If we now set
zaab = zaba = zbaa = zaac = zaca = zcaa =
13
126
zacb = zbac = zcba = 0
ζ =
4
126
and leave the remaining dual variables unchanged, it maintains dual feasibility. This can be verified by
repeating the case analysis above. Cases 1,4,5 are unaffected by the change. In Case 2 the change in the
z variables reduces the right side of each constraint by 4126 but this is compensated by the introduction
of ζ into the right side. In Case 3 the change in the z variables reduces the right side of each constraint
by 2126 , but the analysis in Case 3 established that the right side of each constraint already exceeded
the left side by at least 3126 , so reducing the right side by
2
126 maintains dual feasibility.
Consequently, the objective value of the new dual LP at this feasible solution constitutes an upper
bound on the value of any integer primal solution. The new dual objective value is
4 ·
4
126
+ 6 ·
13
126
+ 18 ·
100
126
=
1894
126
,
whereas the old dual objective value was
6 ·
15
126
+ 3 ·
2
126
+ 18 ·
100
126
=
1896
126
.
Thus, the revenue of the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism improves on the revenue of any
deterministic truthful mechanism by at least a factor of 18961894 > 1.001.
Remark: In the above example, if we take out from the support all points that have a bid 20 in
it, we get a smaller support of 9 points. From the randomized mechanism in the example we induce a
mechanism on this smaller support. We claim that it is not implementable by any universally truthful
mechanism on this support, i.e., it cannot be expressed a convex combination of deterministic truthful
mechanisms.
To see this, consider any deterministic truthful mechanism and let (yis) denote the corresponding
LP solution. Since the values yis are all integers, we proved above that inequality (5) is satisfied.
Our truthful-in-expectation mechanism does not satisfy this linear inequality (it has y2,aab + y3,aab +
y1,aac + y3,baa + y1,baa + y2,caa + y1,aba + y2,aba + y3,aca =
9
2), and hence we have shown that even on this
smaller support, this truthful-in-expectation mechanism cannot be written as a convex combination of
deterministic truthful mechanisms.
Note that in this remark, we used only the fact a < b < c and not the concrete values of a, b and c.
Therefore we have shown the following lemma, which is asserted in the second sentence of Theorem 4.7.
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Lemma D.1 For three bidders, each bidder having only three possible values in the support, there is a
truthful in expectation mechanism that cannot be implemented by any universally truthful mechanism.
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